

IROS 2018 Workshop on Robot Safety:

Filling the Gap Between Technology Offer and Industry Needs for a Fully Deployable Human Robot Collaboration



**Experiences with a control architecture
enabling safe human-robot collaboration**

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


Summary

- physical Human-Robot Interaction (pHRI)
 - safety, coexistence, and collaboration
- control architecture handling pHRI through consistent robot behaviors
- methods and results with
 - lightweight research manipulators ([DLR LWR-III](#), [KUKA LBR 4+](#))
 - lightweight commercial manipulator ([Universal Robots UR10](#))
 - full-size industrial robot in a cell ([ABB IRB 4600](#))
 - medium-size robot with closed control architecture ([KUKA KR5 Sixx](#))
- lessons learned




Hierarchical control architecture of consistent behaviors for safe pHRI



(A. De Luca, F. Flacco: BioRob 2012)



Types of collaborative operations (ISO 10218-1 & -2, and more in TS 15066)



(V. Villani et al.: Mechatronics 2018)

Relation of our control architecture with the ISO collaborative operations

	Speed	Separation Distance	Torques	Operator controls	Main risk reduction
SAFETY Safety-rated monitored stop COEXISTENCE	Zero while operator in Collaborative WS	Small or zero	Gravity + load compensation only	None while operator in Collaborative WS	No motion in presence of operator
Hand guiding COLLABORATION	Safety-rated monitored speed	Small or zero	As by direct operator input	E-stop; Enabling device; Motion input	Motion only by direct operator input
Speed and separation monitoring COEXISTENCE	Safety-rated monitored speed	Safety-rated monitored distance	As required to execute application and maintain min separation distance	None while operator in Collaborative WS	Contact between robot and operator prevented
Power and force limiting COLLABORATION	Max determined by RA to limit impact forces	Small or zero	Max determined by RA to limit static forces	As required by application	By design or control, robot cannot impart excessive force

Implementation of Safety, Coexistence, and Collaboration layers - 1

- 1 sensorless collision **detection** (use this if everything else fails!): robot **stops** and is gravity compensated



DLR LWR-III
IROS 2006 & 2008


- 2 **distinguishing** accidental (hard) collisions from intentional (soft) contacts: robot **reacts** then differently



KUKA LBR 4+
IROS 2014, ICRA 2015

Implementation of Safety, Coexistence, and Collaboration layers - 2

- 1 **continuous coexistence: external sensors** to avoid contact and modify robot motion or reduce speed



- 2 **coexistence dominates collaboration** (with a designated body part) when both actions are inconsistent



KUKA LBR 4+




ICRA 2012, IROS 2013, J Intell Rob Syst 2015



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Implementation of Safety, Coexistence, and Collaboration layers - 3

- 1 **physical collaboration: contact force estimation** combining internal signals and external depth sensing (virtual force sensor)
- 2 **collaboration: force, admittance or impedance control laws** at the **contact** for holding, pushing, ...



KUKA LBR 4+
IROS 2014,
ICRA 2016





RGB-D sensors and efficient distance monitoring in the depth space

$$p_x = \frac{x_C f s_x}{z_C} + c_x$$

$$p_y = \frac{y_C f s_y}{z_C} + c_y$$


$$d_p = z_C$$

no 3D-Cartesian reconstruction or models
no need to use Point Cloud Library (PCL)




one or two Kinects
 to monitor robot workspace
@ 300 Hz
 with minimal gray areas

use distance, e.g., with artificial potentials, for **collision avoidance** during motion or to **slow down/stop** the robot



SYMPLEXITY Laser cell with robotized Manual Polishing (MP) substation




WS monitoring with 2 Kinects


UR10 automatic speed scaling based on sensed H-R distance (zero for physical human-robot collaboration)

ISO/TS15066:2016

RGB & D views from the right Kinect




SYMPLEXITY robotized MP cell with UR10 – control framework




- potential safety-related issues
 - Kinect failure or severe occlusions \Rightarrow no or wrong distance computed
 - distance computation algorithm failure \Rightarrow no control signals provided
 - robot control algorithm failure \Rightarrow unpredictable robot motion
- first two handled separately; last relies on **UR10 safe low-level control**

SYMPLEXITY robotized MP cell – UR10 safe low-level control



	Normal Mode	Reduced Mode
Force	150.00	120.00 N
Power	300.00	200.00 W
Speed	1.50	0.75 m/s
Momentum	25.00	10.00 kg m/s

from the manual



Limit	Maximum	Normal Mode	Reduced Mode
Force	max: 250 N	200	120
Power	max: 1000 W	500	200
Speed	max: 5000 mm/s	3000	750
Momentum	max: 100 kg m/s	50	10


in use: a screenshot..

■ category 0 protective stop

- robot motion is stopped by immediate removal of power
- each joint brakes as fast as possible
- used if a safety-related limit is exceeded or a fault occurs in the safety-related HW of the control system (EN ISO13850:2008 or IEC60204-1:2006)
- user can define limits to be used in Normal Mode
- enforced **also when** an external high-level control software is being used...



Human-Robot Collaboration (HRC) for Manual Polishing




Force/Torque (F/T) sensor at wrist

- manual polishing force is **measured**
- end-effector Jacobian is **known**

contact force at unknown location

- **not** measurable by the F/T sensor
- possibly applied by the human **while** manipulating the work piece held by robot
- contact Jacobian is **not** known



Dynamic model of a robot with contacts and residual computation

- robot **dynamic model** takes the form

$$M(q)\ddot{q} + C(q, \dot{q})\dot{q} + g(q) = \tau + J_e^T(q)F_e + J_c^T(q)F_c$$

- joint torques resulting from different contacts
 - (measured) at the end-effector level
 - at a generic point along the structure

$$\tau_e = J_e^T(q)F_e$$

$$\tau_c = J_c^T(q)F_c$$

- monitor the robot generalized momentum

$$p = M(q)\dot{q}$$

- (model-based) **residual vector signal** to detect and isolate the generic contacts

$$r(t) = K_i \left(p - \int_0^t (C^T(q, \dot{q})\dot{q} - g(q) + \tau + J_e^T(q)F_e - r) ds \right)$$

$$K_i \rightarrow \infty \text{ (sufficiently large)} \Rightarrow r \simeq \tau_c$$

Position/Admittance control during collaborative manual polishing

- when there is **no extra contact** along the structure, **position and orientation** of the end-effector are both held **fixed** by a **stiff kinematic control law**

$$\dot{q} = J_e^\# K_e \begin{pmatrix} v_r \\ \omega_r \end{pmatrix} = J_e^\# K_e \begin{pmatrix} I & 0 \\ 0 & T(\phi) \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} p_d - p \\ \phi_d - \phi \end{pmatrix}$$

as large as possible

↑ constant values

- the controller counterbalances all forces/torques applied by the operator **during manual polishing**
- when the human intentionally **pushes on the robot body**, control of the end-effector **orientation** is **relaxed**

$$J_e(q) = \begin{pmatrix} J_p(q) \\ J_o(q) \end{pmatrix}$$

3x6 for UR10

residual-based reaction
to extra contacts

$$\dot{q} = J_p^\# K_p (p_d - p) + (I - J_p^\# J_p) K_r r$$

- human can reconfigure the arm, thus **reorient the work piece** held by the robot


Emulation of MP: HRC phase – experiments with UR10 at DIAG



no F/T sensor, switching to **Freedrive** mode

Universal Robots UR10
Mechatronics 2018

with F/T sensor, using **residual** method
tuned by accurate dynamic identification



**A Model-Based Residual Approach
for Human-Robot Collaboration
during Manual Polishing Operations**

Claudio Gaz, Emanuele Magrini, Alessandro De Luca



Dipartimento di Ingegneria Informatica, Automatica
e Gestionale, Sapienza Università di Roma

May 2017

Emulation of MP: HRC phase – experimental results with UR10

both forces at the same time...



in all cases, **no linear motion** of EE position!



polishing force only...

extra force detected...

...joints move accordingly



...no joint motion


...joints move due to extra force only



SYMPLEXITY cell for Abrasive Finishing (AF) & Quality Assessment (QA) of Metallic Surface of Workpieces

- robot ABB IRB 4600-60, with integrated SafeMove option
- certified communication with cell PLC, using ProfiSAFE protocol
- due to intrinsic risks in the technological process, only **contactless collaboration** or **HR coexistence** during visual check or measuring phases of the task
- 2 **external** Kinects to recognize human gestures (e.g., automatic doors opening, ...)
- **initially...** only 2 **internal** Kinects at the top corners of the cabin for monitoring human-robot distances

ABB



SYMPLEXITY



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MODENA E REGGIO EMILIA




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Coexistence and contactless collaboration in the SYMPLEXITY industrial cell



External view of the cell




Kinect views of the real-time distance computation

Recognition of human gesture commands by an external Kinect



SYMPLEXITY AF/QA cell with ABB IRB 4600 – control framework



- SafeMove + external I/O modules are considered “safe” (industrial certification)
- potential safety-related issues
 - Kinect failure or severe occlusions \Rightarrow no or wrong distances computed
 - distance computation algorithm failure \Rightarrow no control signals provided
 - \Rightarrow **risk** analysis and assessment \Rightarrow **mitigation** strategies

Risk assessment and mitigation – Kinect failure

■ reasons

- Kinect hardware/driver fails, cable unplugged, ...
- severe occlusion
- bad lighting conditions

■ detection

- captured depth image is always the same
- number of “black” pixels (associated to no valid depth values) in the depth image is larger than a critical threshold
- frame rate is too slow

■ mitigating actions

- activate an alarm (acoustic and/or visual) to warn the operator
- use optional laser scanner or barriers to understand where the human is and possibly slow down or stop the robot



Risk assessment and mitigation – distance computation algorithm failure

■ reasons

- bad communication between robot and host PC (Ethernet unplugged?)
- bad filtering of CAD robot model from the image
- excessive noise in Kinect

■ detection



- discontinuity over short times of the (minimum) distance value
- monitoring and averaging the last few distance samples

■ mitigating actions

- noise filtering of depth image to avoid isolated black pixels
- activate an alarm (acoustic and/or visual) to warn the operator
- define “macro areas” of robot operation using laser scanner or barriers
- if the algorithm fails, robot slows down or stops depending on which macro area the human is in





Additional safety hardware – Laser scanners




- add **two laser scanners** (KEYENCE SZ-V 32n), placed at calf height (~ 50 cm)
- maximize **coverage** of the free area in the cell
- each sensor localizes the (radial) position of the operator in the cell, estimating an **approximate/conservative distance** to the robot
- **no missed situations**: robot slows down or stops according to sensed distance/area
- mixed Kinect/laser scanner solution is a **compromise** between certified safety and a more flexible sharing of the 3D workspace by human and robot

Safety issues – solution with scaling of speed and **extra hardware**




■ working algorithms




risk level
(distance to robot)




■ failure




Final control and communication architecture



HRC under a closed control architecture – KUKA KR5 Sixx R650




- low-level motor control laws **not known nor accessible** to the user
- controller reference is given as a **velocity** or a position **in joint space** (also Cartesian commands are accepted)
- user programs, based e.g. on other exteroceptive sensors (Kinect, F/T sensor, vision) implemented on **external PC via the RSI** (RobotSensorInterface), communicating with KUKA controller **every 12 ms**
- available measures: **joint positions** (by encoders) and (**absolute value** of) **applied motor currents**




typical motor currents on the first three joints

Collision detection and then stop - KUKA KR5 Sixx



high-pass filtering of motor currents (a signal-based detection...)

Distinguish accidental collisions from intentional contact and then collaborate - KUKA KR5 Sixx



both **high-pass** and **low-pass filtering** of motor currents (with time-varying thresholds)
— here the collaboration mode is **manual guidance** of the robot


Other possible robot reactions after collaboration mode is established

collaboration mode:
pushing/pulling
the robot

KUKA KR5 Sixx
ICRA 2013



collaboration mode:
compliant-like
robot behavior



Trials on collision detection and hard/soft contact with human subjects

26 volunteers (informed students, in the age range 20-24, about 20% female)

a total of **168 collisions**, in series of 5 for each user (with repeated attempts)

collision detection	trial 1	trial 2	trial 3	trial 4	trial 5	total count	% over all trials	% over all attempts	% over last trials
at attempt # 1	19	19	18	23	25	104	80%	61.9%	92.6%
at attempt # 2	6	2	4	3	1	16	12.3%	9.5%	3.7%
at attempt # 3	1	4	3	0	0	8	6.2%	4.8%	0%
at attempt # 4	0	1	1	0	0	2	1.5%	1.2%	0%
# of user trials	26	26	26	26	26	130	100%	-	-
robot fails to stop	8	13	13	3	1	38	-	22.6%	3.7%
# of user attempts	34	39	39	29	27	168	-	100%	100%
false stops						6	4.6%	3.6%	

416 contacts, **half** of which were **intended to be soft**

distinguishing between soft contacts (S) and accidental collisions (H)	number of soft trials	number of successes	number of fails	% of successes	% of fails
group 1: sequence SSHHSSHH	52	39	13	75.0%	25.0%
group 1: sequence HHSSHHSS	52	44	8	84.6%	15.4%
group 2: sequence SSSSHHHH	52	44	8	84.6%	15.4%
group 2: sequence HHHHSSSS	52	45	7	86.5%	13.5%
overall	208	172	36	82.7%	17.3%

➡ end-users experience a “learning” process ➡ adapt thresholds!



Including the use of a F/T sensor to isolate whole-body collisions

collaboration
and collision
at end-effector

KUKA KR5 Sixx

submitted to ICRA 2019

collaboration
at end-effector
and collision
on robot body
(also simultaneously)



Conclusions

■ lightweight research manipulators

- dynamic model more easily available, torque control mode, up to 1 KHz loops
- safe collision detection, monitored coexistence, physical collaboration: **feasible**

■ lightweight commercial manipulators

- dynamic model to be identified, no access to current/torque control mode
- certified control software for safety, **otherwise as above**

■ full-size industrial robots in a cell

- **coexistence** can still be achieved (using just kinematic motion commands)
- safety requires **low-level hardware** in place and **certified sensors** for monitoring
- **no** true physical collaboration

■ medium-size robot with closed control architecture

- “poor man’s” access/knowledge, user-defined control loops at low frequency
- **moderate** physical collaborative features could be reached



Acknowledgments

- Fabrizio Flacco (+2016)
- Researchers at DIAG
 - Claudio Gaz, Emanuele Magrini
 - former: Raffaella Mattone
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 - Khaled Al Khudir, Maram Khatib
- Master students at DIAG
 - Andrea Carlesimo, Milad Geravand, Eleonora Mariotti, Beatrice Procoli
- Colleagues at UNIMORE
 - Federica Ferraguti, Fabio Pini
- Colleagues in Munich
 - Alin Albu-Schäffer (DLR), Sami Haddadin (DLR ⇒ ... ⇒ TUM)

