Seminario Interdipartimentale di Algoritmica  

Monday, May 15, 2006, 12:00 noon Abstract
Forward-Security in the Limited Communication Model
Stefan Dziembowski, ETH Zurich

DIS - Department of Computer and System Sciences
Room C3, second floor

Abstract:

We will give a short introduction to the Limited Communication Model (LCM) [1,2,3].  This model was recently proposed as a new method of achieving intrusion-resilience in the cryptographic protocols.  More precisely, it allows to preserve security of cryptographic protocols, even if a malicious program (e.g. a virus) was installed on a computer of an honest user (and it was later removed).  The security of this method relies on the assumption that the amount of data that the adversary can transfer from the infected machine is limited (however, we allow the adversary to perform any efficient computation on user's private data, before deciding on what to transfer).

The LCM has interesting connections with the Bounded-Storage Model (BSM), Compressibility of NP-Instances (a concept recently introducedin [4]), and Private-Information Retrieval (PIR).  We will discuss some of these links (if the time permits).

No prior knowledge of these topics (LCM, BSM, PIR) will be assumed. Some familiarity with the complexity theory and the foundations of cryptography may be useful.